Elección racional y normas sociales: una vuelta más de tuerca

Authors

  • Francisco Linares Martínez Universidad de La Laguna

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2002.i32.717

Keywords:

Game Theory, Collective Action, Selective Incentives, Social Networks, Production Function

Abstract


This paper explores the potential interest in using actual collective action research, within the rational choice paradigm, in the intentional explanation of social norms. After demonstrating the premises of rational choice theory and Olson's analysis of collective action, the article uses the concept of prodüction function to explore the relationships between collective action, microsocial structure, and social norms (conceived as selective incentive systems). The paper ends with a brief reflection conceming the useñilness of refining such a tool and combining different models of decisionmaking in order to explore the difficult meta-theoretical questions of linking structure and action.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Downloads

Published

2002-08-30

How to Cite

Linares Martínez, F. (2002). Elección racional y normas sociales: una vuelta más de tuerca. Revista Internacional De Sociología, 60(32), 77–99. https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2002.i32.717

Issue

Section

Studies