Elección racional y normas sociales: una vuelta más de tuerca
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2002.i32.717Keywords:
Game Theory, Collective Action, Selective Incentives, Social Networks, Production FunctionAbstract
This paper explores the potential interest in using actual collective action research, within the rational choice paradigm, in the intentional explanation of social norms. After demonstrating the premises of rational choice theory and Olson's analysis of collective action, the article uses the concept of prodüction function to explore the relationships between collective action, microsocial structure, and social norms (conceived as selective incentive systems). The paper ends with a brief reflection conceming the useñilness of refining such a tool and combining different models of decisionmaking in order to explore the difficult meta-theoretical questions of linking structure and action.
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