El problema de la emergencia de normas sociales en la acción colectiva. Una aproximación analítica

Francisco Linares Martínez

doi:10.3989/ris.2007.i46.7

Autores/as

Francisco Linares Martínez Universidad de La Laguna. Tenerife.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2007.i46.7

Palabras clave:

Dilemas Sociales, Función de producción, Incentivos sociales, Masa crítica

Resumen

El presente articulo aborda el problema teorico de explicar la emergencia de normas sociales en la accion colectiva. Este problema, a su vez, puede descomponerse en un conjunto de cuestiones que la literatura especializada no ha abordado con el suficiente grado de detalle y que se discuten en distintas secciones de este trabajo: .Que condiciones generan demandas de normas sociales? .Que tipo de norma se empleara para satisfacer cada demanda? .Que incentivos se emplearan en su realizacion? .Que condiciones garantizan que la norma sea realizada de hecho? El articulo finaliza con una serie de conclusiones susceptibles de ser investigadas empiricamente y, de este modo, refinar mas la teoria.

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