The Problem of the Emergence of Social Norms in Collective Action. An Analytical Approach
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2007.i46.7Keywords:
Social Dilemas, Production Function, Social Incentives, Critical MassAbstract
This article faces the theoretical problem of explaining the emergence of social norms in collective action. The problem itself can be divided into several questions which specialized scholarship has not dealt with in enough detail. These questions are argued in the sections of this paper. These are: Which conditions generate a demand for social norms? What type of norm will be used to meet the demand? Which incentives will be used to implement the norm? Under what conditions is it granted that the norm will be actually realized? The article ends with several conclusions which should be empirically investigated, and thus improving the theory.
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