Interlocking Directorates in Spain. Evolution, power, and independent directors

Authors

  • Pablo de Andrés Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
  • David Blanco-Alcántara Universidad de Burgos
  • Óscar López-de-Foronda Universidad de Burgos

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2012.03.13

Keywords:

Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Social Networks, Relationship Interlocking Directorates, Power

Abstract


This study explores the evolution of social networks formed by the connection between boards of directors —interlocking directorates relationship— of Spanish listed companies in the period 1999-2008, and offers a fresh approach to the study of corporate governance. The analysis provides insights into how power structures work in the economic sphere, furthers current understanding of the role played by the board of directors, and explores in greater depth the role of independent directors as promoted by codes of good practices. The results reveal structural changes in the network, which have been further fragmented in recent years and which evidence lower density values, features that are more common among networks in Anglo-American countries. The central analysis reveals a shift in financial sector companies to more peripheral positions, giving greater prominence to private companies within the energy or construction sectors, and indicating a change from the banking model to a more Anglo-American one.

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Published

2014-04-30

How to Cite

de Andrés, P., Blanco-Alcántara, D., & López-de-Foronda, Óscar. (2014). Interlocking Directorates in Spain. Evolution, power, and independent directors. Revista Internacional De Sociología, 72(1), 83–114. https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2012.03.13

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