Cooperar por principio

Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca

doi:10.3989/ris.2007.i46.2

Authors

Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca Instituto Juan March y Universidad Complutense. Madrid

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2007.i46.2

Keywords:

Collective Action, Moral Utility, Crowding Out Effect, Sacrifice

Abstract

This article analyzes the potential role of moral motivation in collective action. It is suggested that moral motivation works very differently from the social norms of reciprocity that have been studied in behavioral economics. A new utility function, combining the traditional arguments of the literature on collective action and a moral factor, is presented. In moral terms, the agent increases or decreases its utility depending on how much it deviates from the social average level of cooperation. Moral utility may transform the Prisoner’s Dilemma into a game more favourable to cooperation. Finally, some implications from the model are drawn with regard to the crowding out effect and the concept of personal sacrifice.

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