The Logic of Collective Action: The Role of Public Goods Production and Perception
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2007.i46.3Keywords:
Game Theory, Interest Groups, Prisoner´s Dilemma, Collective Goods, Common Goods, Jointness of SupplyAbstract
Public goods having different proprieties produce different problems of collective action. This hypothesis has been discussed from different analytical perspectives and we examine their arguments, aiming to deepen our theoretical understanding about the logic of collective action. In this paper we look for similarities and differences regarding their use of concepts and expected results. Simultaneously, we examine the link between different public goods and the interdependent behavior of individuals. To this purpose, we also revisit the connections between production functions and consumption types in the case of public goods, as a mean to explore the potential development of more elaborated models in the theory of collective action, and suggest that more empirical contrast of these models is needed. Finally, we argue the importance for theoretical discussions to include a discussion about the impact of perception in the collective action models, considering systematic deviations to rational choice, and conclude that no single theory may address all collective action problems, but systematic patterns of behavior may be identified and empirically confirmed.
Downloads
References
Agrawal, V.K. y C. Dupont (1999), “Goods, games and Institutions”, International Political Science Review, vol. 20, nº 4, pp. 393-409. doi:10.1177/0192512199204005
Aggarwal, V.K. y C. Dupont (2003), “Comment on ‘Common Goods, Matrix Games and Institutional Response”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 9, nº 3, pp. 1475-478.
Axelrod, R. (1984), The evolution of Cooperation, Nueva York, Basic Books.
Chamberlin, J. (1974), “Provision of Collective Goods as Function of Group Size”, American Political Science Review, vol. 68, nº 2, pp. 707-16. doi:10.2307/1959515
Cornes, R. y S. Ted (1996), The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Esteban, J. y D. Ray (2001), “Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox”, American Political Science Review, vol. 95, pp. 663-672. doi:10.1017/S0003055401003124
Hardin, R. (1971), “Collective Action as an Agreeable N-Prisoners’ Dilemma”, Behavioural Science, vol. 16, pp. 472-81. doi:10.1002/bs.3830160507
Heckathorn, D.D. (1996), “The Dynamics and Dilemmas of Collective Action”, American Sociological Review, vol. 61, nº 2, pp. 250-277. doi:10.2307/2096334
Heckathorn, D.D. (2002), “Development of a Theory of Collective Action: From the Emergence of Norms to AIDS Prevention and the Analysis of Social Structure”, en J. Berger y M. Zelditch (eds), New Directions in Sociological Theory: Growth of Contemporary Theories, San Diego, Rowman and Littlefield.
Hess, C. (2000) (comp.), “Bibliographies from the Workshop Library: Tragedy of the Commons”, http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/wsl/tragedy.html.
Hirshleifer, J. (1983), “From Weakest-Link to Best Shot: the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods”, Public Choice, vol. 41, nº 3, pp. 371-386. doi:10.1007/BF00141070
Holzinger, K. (2003), “Reply to Aggarwal and Dupont’s Comment to The Editor”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 9, nº 2, pp. 173-212. doi:10.1177/1354066103009002002
Holzinger, K. (2003), “Common Goods, Matrix Games and Institutional Response”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 9, nº 2, pp. 173-212. doi:10.1177/1354066103009002002
Holzinger, K. (2001), “Aggregation Technology of Common Goods and its Strategic Consequences. Global Warming, Biodiversity, and Sitting Conflicts”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 40, pp. 117-38. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00592
Jones, P. (2004), “All for One and One for All’: Transactions Cost and Collective Action”, Political Studies, vol. 52, pp. 450-468. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00490.x
Jordana, J. (1992), Els limits de la hipotesi de racionalitat com a Jonament per a les teories de l’accio, Barcelona, Publicacions UB.
Marwell, G. y P. Oliver (1993), The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Mercer, J. (2005), “Prospect Theory and Political Science”, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 8, pp. 1-21. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104911
Oliver, P.E. y G. Marwell (2001), “Whatever Happened to Critical Mass Theory? A retrospective and Assessment”, Sociological Theory, vol. 19, nº 3, pp. 292-311. doi:10.1111/0735-2751.00142
Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. (2005), Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Ostrom, E. (2003), “How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 15, nº 3, pp. 239-270. doi:10.1177/0951692803015003002
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner y J. Walker (1994), Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
Pecorino, P. y A. Temini (2004), “Olson’s Logic Revisited: The Role of Small Fixed Costs of Participation”, Working Paper Series–Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, University of Alabama.
Rapoport, A. (1988), “Experiments with N-Person Social Traps I: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Weak Prisoner’s Dilemma, Volunteer’s Dilemma, and Largest Number”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 32, nº 1, pp. 457-472. doi:10.1177/0022002788032003003
Runge, F. C. (1984), “Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action”, Journal of Politics, vol. 46, nº 1, pp. 154-181. doi:10.2307/2130438
Sandler, T. (1992), Collective Action. Theory and Applications, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
Schelling, T.C. (1973), “Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons and Daylight Savings: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 17, nº 3, pp. 381-428. doi:10.1177/002200277301700302
Snidal, D.J. (1985), “Coordination versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes”, vol. 79, pp. 923-942.
Szlagyi, M.N. (2000), “Quantitative Relationships between Collective Action and Prisioners’ Dilemma”, Systems Research and Behavioural Science, vol. 17, pp. 65-72. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-1743(200001/02)17:1<65::AID-SRES272>3.0.CO;2-U
Taylor, M. (1987), The Possibility of Cooperation, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, M. y H. Ward (1982), “Chickens, Whales and Lumpy Goods: Alternatives Models of Public Goods Provision”, Policy Studies, vol. 30, pp. 350-70. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1982.tb00545.x
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2007 Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
© CSIC. Manuscripts published in both the print and online versions of this journal are the property of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, and quoting this source is a requirement for any partial or full reproduction.
All contents of this electronic edition, except where otherwise noted, are distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence. You may read the basic information and the legal text of the licence. The indication of the CC BY 4.0 licence must be expressly stated in this way when necessary.
Self-archiving in repositories, personal webpages or similar, of any version other than the final version of the work produced by the publisher, is not allowed.
