Economía y psicología. Entre el método y la teoría

Abstract

Findings in psychological research have been exposing the problems of many assumptions in economic theory. In this paper, four different methodological perspectives about the psychological hypotheses in economic theory are shown. They can each be translated into diverse ways of confronting the empirical challenges. The four different interpretations are dependent on different ontological theses about nature's unity. In the first one —ontological monism— economic theory rests on a psychological hypothesis which is empirically assessed, as any genuine theory must be. In the second —methodological dualism— the empirical findings only challenge the (intentional) explanatory model, disregarding the empirical record. In the third —ontological dualism— psychological hypotheses have a (quasi) logical nature as well as a more normative one, and therefore is not affected by experimental results. Finally, methodological monism rejects the notion that economic theory —or, in general, social theory— requires explanatory models that invoke mental states and that, because social sciences don't appeal to intentional reasons, the results of psychological investigation are irrelevant to its assumptions. Each one of these interpretations is associated with a different way of understanding economic theory, as well as the nature and importance of the rationality hypothesis.