Una defensa de la preferencia revelada

Keith Dowding

doi:10.3989/ris.2008.i49.80

Autores/as

Keith Dowding London School of Economics

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2008.i49.80

Palabras clave:

Externismo, Preferencias, Teoría de juegos, Teoría de la utilidad

Resumen

En este artículo se defiende el análisis mediante preferencias reveladas (APR) de los ataques de Dan Hausman, para quien dicho análisis no es claro ni proporciona ventaja empírica alguna. El APR es compatible con las versiones externistas de la filosofía de la mente, para las que la preferencia se interpreta, y obtiene su significado, mediante la comprensión de las acciones de los sujetos estudiados. En el artículo se sostiene que Hausman defiende su conclusión porque supone que preferencia significa “deseo”. En el análisis empírico el APR es inevitable, dado que los resultados se interpretan a través de la acción intencional de los seres humanos. Asimismo, es especialmente importante en el análisis de datos agregados. Una de las confusiones de la crítica filosófica del APR consiste en tratar las explicaciones de “tipos” como si se refirieran a cada caso individual dentro de un tipo. El artículo finaliza con algunas reflexiones sobre cuestiones éticas del uso del APR.

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