El rompecabezas de las preferencias sociales
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2011.09.03Palabras clave:
Dilema sociales, Experimentos, Preferencias sociales, SancionesResumen
Presentamos un breve panorama de la literatura en economía experimental sobre preferencias sociales. En numerosos experimentos, participantes con incentivos económicos están dispuestos a sacrificar parte de sus ingresos materiales para compensar el comportamiento amable de otros o a pagar un precio positivo para castigar el comportamiento de individuos egoístas. En economía todas estas acciones reciben el calificativo de sociales, porque no hay una manera clara de reconciliarlas con alguna forma razonable de egoísmo puro. Nos centramos en juegos de dilemas sociales y queremos transmitir dos mensajes. Primero, la investigación en economía experimental ha producido abundante evidencia que ilustra los componentes sociales de las preferencias de las personas. Segundo, sanciones sociales de diferentes tipos desempeñan un papel importante a la hora de facilitar el comportamiento cooperativo.
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