TOWARDS AN EGALITARIAN SOCIETY: FAMILY GENDER VALUES IN THE YOUNG PEOPLE OF GERMANY, NORWAY AND SPAIN

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to analyse how gendered values towards parental responsibilities play into the dynamic of transformation of the male breadwinner family model from a comparative perspective among young people. In this review, we will focus primarily on attitudes rather than actual behaviour. The male breadwinner model is a model of the family in which the man is the main economic provider while the woman does the domestic labour and takes care of the family members. This traditional family model is evolving towards the post-patriarchal family model known as the dual earner family characterised by symmetry in gender roles as a result of women’s rising educational and labour market participation, with disparities on the trends observed in family changes across countries. Women’s labour market participation has increased widely across many different welfare regimes, as has the dual earner family model, but the breadwinner culture is strongly embedded in values and gender roles. Literature has confirmed that the family model is gendered and that work task specialisation is based on gender normative values (Hagqvist 2016Hagqvist, E. (2016). The juggle and struggle of everyday life Gender, division of work, work-family perceptions and well-being in different policy contexts, Doctoral tesis). Genders are constructed differently across contexts, and countries policies and norms seem to play an important role in defining family values.

The trend in Western European countries is to move away from the male breadwinner model and towards a dual earner one, although there is still diversity at the nation-state level depending on family policies developed. Norway has moved closest to an equal model of gender relations: women’s participation in the labour market is high, childcare and parental leave for mothers and fathers are well developed. Spain has made the transition from a ‘male breadwinner model’ towards a more diversified pattern of family formation with regards to the labour market participation of women and family policies, although progress is less identifiable in childcare practices and gender attitudes (León and Migliavaca 2013León, M. and Migliavacca, M. 2013. “Italy and Spain: Still the Case of Familistic Welfare Models?”. Population Review 52 (1): 25-42.; Meil et al. 2919Meil G., Romero-Balsas, P. and Castrillo Bustamante, C. 2019. The effectiveness of corporate gender equality plans in improving leave provisions for fathers in Spain. Comunity, Work and Family, 22 (1), 96-110. https://doi.org/10.1080/13668803.2018.1541165 ; Moreno Mínguez and Crespi 2016Moreno Mínguez, A. and Crespi I. 2016. “Gender equality and family changes in the work-family culture in Southern Europe”. International Review of Sociology, 27 (3): 394-420. DOI: 10.1080/03906701.2017.1377406 ). In Western Germany, a strong male-breadwinner model represented the norm for decades, anchored in the gender pay gap, inadequate child care provision, and in the tax and social security systems which favour families with one earner (Pfau-Effinger 2004Pfau-Effinger, B. 2004. “Socio-historical paths of the male breadwinner model - an explanation of cross-national differences”. The British Journal of Sociology 55 (3):377-399. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00025.x ). The on-going transformation of the male breadwinner family model has been among the most remarkable societal changes of the past 50 to 60 years. This appears to be occurring in two parts: the growth of female labour force participation accompanied by the increase in men’s involvement in childcare and housework. These overlapping parts are, in essence, the gender revolution (Goldscheider et al. 2015Goldscheider, F.; Bernhardt, E. and Lappegård, T. 2015. “The Gender Revolution: A Framework for Understanding Changing Family and Demographic Behavior”, 41 2 : 207-239. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00045.x ).

Our study contributes to the literature in three important ways. Firstly, it extends a growing body of literature aimed at understanding family changes in relation to the traditional family models by revising the literature from a comparative and critical perspective focusing on young people. Drawing attention to the role of values in family formation, work and family strategies in young people, we complement in this article the socio-demographic and economic explanations of young people’s behavioural choices. Thus, the purpose of this article is to go beyond the classic dualistic theoretical interpretation of agency versus structure present in studies of family values change. Secondly, we add a cross-national perspective and compare this association in countries of low, medium and high diffusion of the male breadwinner family model. Thus, this article critically discusses how the context shapes the opportunities and constraints of family attitudes in the process of transition to adulthood (Liefbroer and Billari 2009Liefbroer, A.C and Billari, F. (2009). “Bringing Norms Back In: A Theoretical and Empirical Discussion of Their Importance for Understanding Demographic Behaviour”. Popul. Space Place16: 287-305). Thirdly, the article addresses how socio-demographic factors, such as education, are a key factor in the progress towards a more egalitarian family in a country with a strong family tradition, such as Spain (Matějů et al 2006Matějů, P.Michael L. Smith, Weidnerová, S.Petra Anýžová, P. 2017. “The role of basic values and education on women’s work and family preferences in Europe”. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 37 (9/10): 494-514. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-10-2016-0117 ). Thirdly, we make use of prospective survey data on the values of young people in three countries with different welfare regimes. This enables us to capture attitudes towards the male breadwinner model family in three European countries. The study of cross-national variations in norms/values may thus provide a helpful analytical tool to better understand the different forms and “rhythms” of changes in family life courses and gender ideology across countries. The results presented here provide a basis reference for assessing the social significance of an increasing numbers of young people in dual earner families that are not gender-normative to the same extent depending on the country.

Understanding how family values of young people are formed in different institutional contexts will help researchers to gain knowledge about how these values can influence an individual’s behaviour in the future and how this might finally affect their family strategies, child wellbeing and gender equality. Furthermore, one or the foremost contributions of this paper is the introduction of young people in current debates on family studies. In addition to the lack of studies into family values of young people, this study uses a sample of youth population in Germany, Spain and Norway, which provides interesting findings.

LITERATURE REVIEW

One area that has received very little attention in the literature on the family related transitions to adulthood is the analysis of values related to family models as a possible driver for family change. However, this issue is important because it allows us to advance our knowledge of dilemmas in the pursuit of gender equality. The lack of data on young people’s family values is problematic in terms of achieving this research objective. We are aware of this methodological hurdle in our study, and we therefore set out to analyse young people’s values related to the equitable family model by identifying the possible incidence of socio-demographic variables using a comparative cultural analysis.

The scientific literature has tried to explain how values influence family change from widely varying and contradictory paradigms. These interpretive models try to explain different dimensions of the transformation of the male breadwinner family model, although only on limited occasions do these paradigms refer to young people in the transition process to adulthood.

First of all, Ulrich Beck’s rational choice theory accepts the notion of “gender norms” in research about seeking a rational explanation of social behaviour (Beck 1986Beck, Ulrich 1986: Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.; 1993Beck, U.; Beck-Gernsheim, E. 1993. Nicht Autonomie, sondern Bastelbiographie: Anmerkungen zur Individualisierungsdiskussion am Beispiel des Aufsatzes von Günter Burkart. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 22, 3: 178-187. https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-1993-0302 ). According to Baker and Jacobsen (2007)Baker M.J. and Jacobsen, J.P. 2007. “Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor”. Journal of Labor Economics, 25 4: 763-793. https://doi.org/10.1086/522907 , the negotiated division of work can help attenuate conflicts between family members over the work-life balance. This explanation justifies the existence of preferences, but fails to explain how people internalise them and adapt their behaviour accordingly. Akerlof and Kranton (2000)Akerlof, G. and Kranton R. 2000. “Economics and Identity”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (3): 715-753. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554881 have formulated an economic model that includes gender identity. These authors report that couples tend to choose family and work options that maximise the utility of gender roles, thus contributing to the reinforcement of gender identity. Auspurg and Gundert (2015)Auspurg, K., and Gundert, S. 2015. “Precarious employment and bargaining power: Results of a factorial survey analysis”. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 44 (2): 99-117. https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-2015-0204 consider that the influence of gender identity in individual utility offers a possible explanation of why women do more domestic chores than their male partners, and why women prefer a traditional family model, even when their earnings and the hours they spend in paid work are equal to or longer than those of their partners. According to this approach, gender identity, shaped by the internalisation of gender norms, conditions the attitudes of men and women and is projected in their practical behaviour. However, Becker (1961) proposes that gender attitude is not a key issue in the division of labour, but rather that it exists as a response to the differential returns from paid and care work typical of men and women. Thus, the hegemony of the rational choices is certainly not appropriate for our aim because this theoretical interpretation fails to provide a satisfactory response to the cross-national variations observed at macro level in the attitudes of young people towards family models, as other researchers have already pointed out (Lück 2014Luck, D. (2014). “Family values and family norms: What impact does culture have on familial and generative bejaviour”, Comparative Population Studies, 39 (3): 451-464. DOI: 10.12765/CPoS-2014-12de ; Tyrell 2016Tyrell, F. A., Wheeler, L. A., Gonzales, N. A., Dumka, L., & Millsap, R. (2016), Family influences on Mexican American adolescents’ romantic relationships: Moderation by gender and culture. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 26, 142-158. doi: 10.1111/jora.12177 ).

On the other hand, The Second Demographic Transition (SDT) approach focuses particularly on internalised individual values to explain changes in fertility and family life. The main driver of these changes is a powerful and irreversible shift in attitudes in the direction of greater individual freedom and self-actualisation (Lesthaeghe 2010Lesthaeghe, R. 2010. “The unfolding story of the second demographic transition,” Population and Development Review 36: 211-251. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00328.x ; Van de Kaa 1987; Batol and Morgan 2017). In this sense, changes in family structures can be considered as part of a process of “individualisation” and “deinstitutionalisation”, as well as a weakening of social norms that organise and structure family life (Beck 1992). One of the weaknesses of this paradigm is that it does not pay sufficient attention to the normative importance of social determinants. The individualisation approach (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1994Beck, U.; Beck-Gernsheim, E. 1993. Nicht Autonomie, sondern Bastelbiographie: Anmerkungen zur Individualisierungsdiskussion am Beispiel des Aufsatzes von Günter Burkart. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 22, 3: 178-187. https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-1993-0302 ) coincides with this, as it assumes that individuals are freed from the normative constraints imposed by family policy and religious institutions. According to the individualisation approach and the SDT, there are considerable differences in social norms with regard to gender and family roles across post-industrial societies (Liefbroer and Billari 2010Liefbroer, A.C and Billari, F. (2009). “Bringing Norms Back In: A Theoretical and Empirical Discussion of Their Importance for Understanding Demographic Behaviour”. Popul. Space Place16: 287-305; Sobotka 2008Sobotka T. 2008. Overview chapter 6: The diverse faces of the second demographic transition in Europe. Demographic research. 8;19:171-224. 10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.8 ). Researchers have found the SDT to be a useful overview of these family trends, but there is little consensus on what their determinants and consequences might be, or indeed on how general they are (Bernhardt 2004Bernhardt E. 2004. “Is the Second Demographic Transition a useful concept for demography?” Vienna yearbook of population research 25-28.; Cliquet 1992Cliquet RL. 1991. The second demographic transition: fact or fiction? Strasbourg: Council of Europe.; Coleman 2004Coleman D. 2004. Why we don’t have to believe without doubting in the” Second Demographic Transition”-some agnostic comments. Vienna yearbook of population research. 2004:11-24; Van de Kaa 2004Van De Kaa, D. 2004. Is the Second Demographic Transition a Useful Research Concept: Questions and Answers, Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2(2004):4-10 DOI: 10.1553/populationyearbook2004s4 ). The main problem of this unilinear interpretation of family change is that the SDT fails to predict many contemporary patterns of change and /or difference from a gender perspective (Solsona, 1998Solsona M. 1998 The second demographic transition from a gender perspective. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research. 11:211-25. https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.1998.9968562 ).

Along the same line of interpretation, preference theory is based on the idea that individual values shape work-family orientations much more than socio-economic and cultural conditions, even though education may help women overcome social barriers in the choice of their professional career and family preferences (Hakims 2000Hakim, C. 2000. Work-lifestyle choices in the 21st century: Preference theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; Matějů et al. 2017Matějů, P.Michael L. Smith, Weidnerová, S.Petra Anýžová, P. 2017. “The role of basic values and education on women’s work and family preferences in Europe”. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 37 (9/10): 494-514. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-10-2016-0117 ).

Another version of the cultural approach is the theory of gender arrangements (Pfau-Effinger 1996; Pfau-Effinger et al. 2009Pfau-Effinger, B., Flaquer, L. and Jensen, Per H. Eds. 2009. Formal and Informal Work in Europe. The Hidden Work Regime. New York: Routledge.) and other studies that argue that national differences not only stem from different economic circumstances, but are also linked to norms and “Leitbilder” (Pfau-Effinger 1996: 467). However, these two theoretical approaches are hardly able to break the hegemony of rational choice for they do not offer any extensive explanatory approaches, but are limited to very specific issues and contexts. The gender arrangement theory mainly explains national differences in maternal labour force participation, without further investigating the meaning of change in family models beyond the labour dimension.

In short, debate in studies on family values focuses on discerning whether individual factors, structural factors, or both, determine family values and attitudes and family models. According to Crompton et al. (2007)Crompton R., Lewis S. and Lyonette C. 2007. “Introduction: The Unravelling of the ‘Male breadwinner’ Model - and Some of its Consequences”. In: Crompton R., Lewis S., Lyonette C. eds Women, Men, Work and Family in Europe.London: Palgrave Macmillan., the increase in women’s - and particularly mothers’- participation in the workplace leads to more dual-earner families, which in turn affects couple relationships, fertility, and the recognition of the problems of work-life balance, all of which require a reorganisation of gender roles and family policies. In Crompton’s interpretive approach, the incorporation of women into the labour market is a key factor in the behaviour deriving from family values in terms of the organisation of work and the family. This researcher’s hypothesis is that social class determines family values, and hence women’s employment choices. This empirical evidence contradicts the arguments of Hakim’s preference theory (2000Hakim, C. 2000. Work-lifestyle choices in the 21st century: Preference theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.), according to which family values are freely chosen by women regardless of their social status. According to her results, whereas more highly-educated women are more flexible and mostly subscribe to post-patriarchal family values, less well-educated women reduce their working hours or even give up work entirely to care for their children and other family members, as they are employed in unskilled, repetitive and poorly-paid jobs. Along the same line of interpretation, Pfau-Effinger (2004)Pfau-Effinger, B. 2004. “Socio-historical paths of the male breadwinner model - an explanation of cross-national differences”. The British Journal of Sociology 55 (3):377-399. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00025.x puts forward the idea that the persistence of the male breadwinner family model in certain institutional contexts is a product of the cultural effects of the historical development of middle-class normative expectations on the ideal family model.

These interpretive models have limitations in terms of explaining the attitudes of young people in the different institutional contexts as they fail to include the incidence of sociodemographic variables. For example, in the Spanish case, where equality policies have only recently been developed, socio-economic status and age are key in supporting the egalitarian family model (Moreno Mínguez et al. 2017Moreno Mínguez, A., Ortega Gaspar, M. and Gamero, C. 2017. “Los modelos familiares en España: reflexionando sobre la ambivalencia familiar desde una aproximación teórica”. Revista Española de Sociología, 26 (2): 149-167. http://dx.doi.org/10.22325/fes/res.2016.5 ); in Norway studies indicate that the greater institutional advance in gender equality matches attitudes that favour the post-patriarchal family. Thus, cultural theories mainly explain the division of work between women and men, but fail fully to account for variations in family attitudes and values over the course of a life, and are limited to shaping the reproduction of gender norms in the transition to adulthood.

According to the Multiple Equilibrium Framework proposed by Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015)Esping-Andersen, G. and Billari, C. 2015. “Re-theorizing Family Demographics”, Population and Development Review 41 (1):, 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00024.x , family preferences have remained relatively stable, as the change in the family dynamic is a consequence of the transformation of gender roles that emerge after a normative change. This explains the erosion of the male breadwinner model as a generalised, although slow and progressive, trend. The period of stable family balance seen in the industrial revolution has thus given way to a long period of uncertainty and normative confusion which has had significant impact on new family identities. However, these demographic and economic paradigms are not sufficiently attentive to the role of social norms in influencing intra-household gender dynamics and norms in countries with low gender equality in the family in terms of age. In this regard, the Spanish case responds to the prototype of change in family models in transition, where family values are ambivalent in regard to the new post-patriarchal family (Moreno Mínguez et al. 2017Moreno Mínguez, A., Ortega Gaspar, M. and Gamero, C. 2017. “Los modelos familiares en España: reflexionando sobre la ambivalencia familiar desde una aproximación teórica”. Revista Española de Sociología, 26 (2): 149-167. http://dx.doi.org/10.22325/fes/res.2016.5 ; Moreno Mínguez and Crespi 2016Moreno Mínguez, A. and Crespi I. 2016. “Gender equality and family changes in the work-family culture in Southern Europe”. International Review of Sociology, 27 (3): 394-420. DOI: 10.1080/03906701.2017.1377406 ). Spain is the prototype of the southern European country with a Mediterranean family model characterised by family solidarity, or what is also known as familism (Calzada and Brooks 2013Calzada, I and Brooks, C. 2013. “The Myth of Mediterranean Familism”, European Societies, 15 (4): 514-534. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2013.836402 ; Leon and Migliavacca 2013León, M. and Migliavacca, M. 2013. “Italy and Spain: Still the Case of Familistic Welfare Models?”. Population Review 52 (1): 25-42.; Ferrera 1996Ferrera, M. 1996. “The Southern model of welfare in Social Europe. Journal of European Social Policy, 6 (1): 17-37. https://doi.org/10.1177/095892879600600102 ; 1998Ferrera, M. 1998. “The Four ‘Social Europes: Between Universalism and Selectivity”. In: Rhodes M., Mény Y. eds The Future of European Welfare. London: Palgrave Macmillan; Naldini 2003Naldini, M. 2003. The Family in the Mediterranean Welfare State. London and Portland: Frank Cass.; Naldini and Jurado 2013Naldini, M. and Jurado, T. 2013. “Family and welfare state reorientation in Spain and inertia in Italy from a European perspective”. Population Review, 52 (1): 43-61. https://doi.org/10.1353/prv.2013.0003 ), and a reductionist welfare state in terms of family support (Liebfried 1997Leibfried, S. 1992. “Towards a European welfare state?”, in C. Pierson and F. G. Castles eds., The Welfare State Reader, Cambridge: PolityPress, pp. 190207. Lipsmeyer, C. S. and Nordstrom; Saraceno 2004Saraceno, C. 2004. ‘The Italian family from the 1960 to the present’. Modern Italy 9 (1) : 4757. https://doi.org/10.1080/13532940410001677494 ).

On the other hand, life course theorists argue that values within the family sphere have been remarkably stable over time (Scott 2006Scott, J. 2006. Families and gender roles: How attitudes are changing” Arxius15: 143-154.), suggesting that “the demise of traditional family values has been exaggerated” (Scott 2006: 16Scott, J. 2006. Families and gender roles: How attitudes are changing” Arxius15: 143-154.). This interpretation fits with the socialisation theory of the gender ideology paradigm (Sullivan et al 2018Sullivan, O. Gershuny, J. and Robinson, P. 2018. “Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution? A Long-Term Processual Framework for Understanding Why Change Is Slow: Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution?”. Journal of Family Theory and Review 10 2: 263-279. https://doi.org/10.1111/jftr.12248 ). According to Sullivan et al. (2018)Sullivan, O. Gershuny, J. and Robinson, P. 2018. “Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution? A Long-Term Processual Framework for Understanding Why Change Is Slow: Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution?”. Journal of Family Theory and Review 10 2: 263-279. https://doi.org/10.1111/jftr.12248 and Sullivan (2006)Sullivan, O. 2006 . Changing gender relations, changing families: Tracing the pace of change. New York: Roman and Littlefiled. , gender norms influence all levels of society, from macro-level government policies and distribution of resources to the micro level of individual attitudes and behaviours. She suggests that this change should not be interpreted in terms of revolutionary change but as a “slow and persistent drip feed of change” resulting in the dissolution of existing structures, dependent on the institutional policies and generational change of gender attitudes. According to these findings, despite the process of pluralizing family forms and individualizing attitudes reflected in family models, the family values of young people remain relatively stable, especially in Spain and Germany, where family policies have promoted the permanence of the breadwinner family model trough different institutional strategies in family policy. On the other hand, in countries that have developed a tradition of egalitarian policies, there is less attitudinal ambivalence and support for the egalitarian and co-responsible family is greater, as in the case of Norway. This may explain, to some extent, why broader social norms support the maintenance of traditional gender identities and divisions of work (to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the cultural context and family policies). While gender ideology is becoming more egalitarian over time, behaviour change is slow and ambivalent (Davis et al. 2007Davis, S. N., Greenstein, T. N., and Gerteisen Marks, J. P. 2007. “Effects of union type on division of household labor: Do cohabiting men really perform more housework?”. Journal of Family Issues, 28: 1246-1272. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192513X07300968 ).

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY AND HYPOTHESIS

Based on the ideas presented in the previous section, the objective of this study is to analyse to what extent young people respond to a post-patriarchal gender ideology in three countries with very different institutional and family contexts. Within the scope of this general question we seek to analyse how far socio-demographic factors configure post-patriarchal values.

Our starting point is based on the criticism of scientific and dualistic literature that points to a convergence in the processes and mechanisms that lead to gender equality in the different European countries. However, these contradictory processes vary depending on generations and occur at different rates subject to the influence of individual, institutional factors and those related to the gender ideology (Sullivan et al. 2018Sullivan, O. Gershuny, J. and Robinson, P. 2018. “Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution? A Long-Term Processual Framework for Understanding Why Change Is Slow: Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution?”. Journal of Family Theory and Review 10 2: 263-279. https://doi.org/10.1111/jftr.12248 ).

The transitional stage in which young people define their values in regard to the family, the couple, children and work is key to understanding the future of the family, although it is an issue that has not received sufficient attention in family and youth sociology. For this reason, our analysis focuses on young people aged between 18 and 35.

At this point of the youth transition, education is a determining factor which explains differences in family values among young people in Spain (an example of a familist country); this can therefore be seen as a differentiating factor in the analysis of young people’s cultural transition towards the new post-patriarchal family model. Several studies have concluded that education is a strong predictor of attitudes to the work-life balance and acts in relation to other social and cultural variables (Crompton and Lyonette 2005Crompton, R. and Lyonette, C. 2000. “The new Gender essentialism - domestic and family ‘choices’ and their relation to attitudes”. British Journal of Sociology, 56 (4): 601-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2005.00085.x ; De Backer et al. 2008DeBacker, T. K., Crowson, H. M., Beesley, A. D., Thoma, S. J., and Hestevold, N. L. 2008. 2The challenge of measuring epistemic beliefs: An analysis of three self-report instruments”. The Journal of Experimental Education, 76 (3): 281-312. https://doi.org/10.3200/JEXE.76.3.281-314 ; Van Wel and Knijn 2007Van Wel, F. and Knijn, T. 2007. “Single mothers’ motivation to work and their participation in the labour market in the Netherlands”. International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 33 (1): 183-196.).

Our study includes other socio-demographic variables such as the type of relationship (cohabiting or married), the employment situation of the partners that make up the couple, and the number of children; we believe these variables may have some incidence in family values in the case of Spain, given that this is a country currently in transition towards a post-patriarchal family model. With regard to the type of union, the available studies show that young people who opt for cohabitation are on average more in favour of the equitable gender role model and post-patriarchal family models (Thornton et al. 2007Thornton, A., Axinn, W. G., and Xie, Y. 2007. Marriage and cohabitation. London: University of Chigaco Press.; Lye and Waldrom 1997Lye, D., and Waldron, I. 1997. “Attitudes toward cohabitation, family, and gender roles: relationships to values and political ideology”. Sociological Perspectives, 40: 199-225. https://doi.org/10.2307/1389522 ; Perelli-Harris 2012Perelli-Harris, Brienna et al. 2012. “Changes in union status during the transition to parent-hood: An examination of 11 European countries”, Population Studies: A Journal of Demography 66 (2): 167-182), in addition to being less exposed to normative determinisms on family models (Brines and Joyner 1999Brines, J., and Joyner, K. 1999. “The ties that bind: Principles of cohesion in cohabitation and marriage”. American Sociological Review, 64: 333-355. DOI: 10.2307/2657490 ; Kasearu 2009Kasearu, K. 2009. “The Effect of Union Type on Work-Life Conflict in Five European Countries”, Soc Indic Res 93:549-567. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-008-9432-3 ). Unfortunately, the survey does not include variables referring to the pluralisation of family typologies, which could explain some of the differences observed between countries.

In regard to the employment situation, the studies show that unemployment is associated with more traditional values towards the male breadwinner model (Bittman et al. 2003, Brines 1994Brines J. 1994. “Economic dependency, gender, and the division of labor at home”. American Journal of Sociology, 100, 652-688. https://doi.org/10.1086/230577 ; Greenstein 2000Greenstein T. 2000. “Economic dependence, gender, and the division of labor in the home: A replication and extension2. Journal of Marriage and the Family: 62,322-335. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2000.00322.x ; Killewald and Gough 2010Killewald A, Gough M. 2010. “Money isn’t everything: Wives’ earnings and housework time”. Social Science Research, 39:987-1003. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.08.005 ). The literature has widely documented how the effects of unemployment on normative expectations on family vary according to the sex of the partner in the couple (West and Zimmerman 1987West, C., and Zimmerman, D. H. 1987 . “Doing gender.Gender and Society”, 1: 125-151.). The limited number of studies carried out in Spain demonstrate that for men with traditional family values, unemployment feeds traditional gender values in response to a stereotypical “masculine identity” that is under threat, so the increased time available due to this situation of unemployment does not represent an immediate rebalancing of domestic chores (Domínguez Folgueras 2012Domínguez Folgueras, M. 2012. “La división del trabajo doméstico en las parejas españolas. Un análisis del uso del tiempo”. Revista Internacional de Sociología, 70 (1): 153-179. https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2009.08.26 ; González et. al. 2010González, M. J., Miret, P. and Treviño, R. 2010. “Just living together: implications of cohabitation for fathers, participation in child care in Western Europe”. Demographic Research, 23 (16) : 445-478.; Tur-Prats 2017Tur-Prats, A. 2017 Unemployment and Intimate-Partner Violence: A Gender-Identity Approach, Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series, Working Paper nº 963). On the other hand, our interpretive model integrates the idea that values within the family sphere (gender ideology) have been remarkably stable over time (Braun and Scott 2009Braun, M. and Scott, J. 2009. “Gender-role egalitarianism: Is the trend reversal real?” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 21(3): 362-367. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edp032 ; Scott 2006Scott, J. 2006. Families and gender roles: How attitudes are changing” Arxius15: 143-154.), even among young people.

According to these ideas our hypothesis is that young people share a normative ideology that is differentiated according to the institutional context and their personal socio-economic conditions. In the Spanish case, the persistence of traditional family values is contextualized in a family culture that has traditionally supported the male bread winner. However, these values are partially reduced by the educational gradient, in contrast to Norway with a policy of egalitarian tradition and Germany with implicit support from the Welfare State to the traditional family.

METHODOLOGY

The data used come from the European Social Survey (ESS). The European Social Surveys of 2010 and 2004 on work and family orientations, provide an opportunity to explore this area of knowledge for the young population aged between 18 and 35. The 5th wave of the 2010 survey has the rotating module entitled “Family, work and well-being” which includes questions on the ideology of gender roles. For our analysis we have selected the group of young men and women under the age of 35. We focused on the Spanish case and took as our reference for the comparison two very different countries in terms of family policies, family models and gender relations, namely Norway and Germany. For the descriptive statistical analysis of the sample, the number of cases in each category and the corresponding percentage were calculated for the qualitative variables, and the mean and standard deviation for the quantitative variables. The logistical regression model was used to determine which variables have a significant effect on the variable entitled “patriarchal culture”.

In order to answer the question posed in this article on the entrenchment of the progress to post-patriarchal culture in gender and family relations among young people, we selected what we call “patriarchal family culture” as the dependent variable, because the measure of this question gives us the value for the degree of decline in attitudes towards the breadwinner model. After numerous analyses with several of the questions in the survey we decided to select the degree of agreement with the statement “Women should be willing to leave the workplace to take care of the family” as the dependent variable, to which the respondents answered on a scale (completely agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, completely disagree).

We worked with a large number of questions in the survey to derive the independent variables, although the article only includes those that were significant in the proposed analytical model, as follows:

Gender ideology:

Sociodemographic variables:

Other independent variables that were introduced in the analytical models were discarded as they were not found to be significant. These variables were ‘sex’, ‘partner that contributes most to the family income’, ‘lives with partner’, ‘educational level of partner’, ‘it is important to follow traditions’, and ‘number of hours partner dedicates to domestic chores’.

The statistical technique was based on descriptive analyses and the application of logistical regression for each country selected. After identifying common attitudes of family and gender, we assess heterogeneity in countries by sociodemographic background and gender ideology.

As sociodemographic variables may shape both the variation in each country and the comparison with other countries, a multiple linear regression model was used to determine the relationship of patriarchal family culture, and sociodemographic and gender ideology variables were found to be related to family values. The sample was desegregated by sex but this did not prove to be significant. The analysis initially included more countries, but they were not significant for the objectives of the analysis and were therefore discarded.

Although this transversal analysis has methodological limitations, the study provides a novel methodological way of understanding how gender ideology and sociodemographic factors explain the differences in the family attitudes of young people in each country and in comparison with other countries. This study, using a sample of young population in Germany, Spain and Norway provides interesting compared findings with implications for future research and policymakers on youth and family policy.

RESULTS

The data in Table 1 correlate the presence of this normative diversity among young people under 35 in the three countries studied. Norway ranks first, as it is the country with the highest percentage of young people in favour of women working full-time, in contrast to Germany where this percentage is lower than 10%. In Spain and Germany, the percentage of young people who believe that women should remain at home is relatively high, indicating that the male breadwinner family model still persists in certain groups of young people. In both Germany and Spain, the preferred option is for the woman to work part-time, as this is considered the best solution for working and being able to care for the family. The difference between men and women is narrower in Norway, whereas in Spain and Germany the gap is more pronounced, particularly in regard to women’s support for part-time work. A greater proportion of men are in favour of women remaining at home (19.8% in Spain and 24% in Germany) compared to women (14.2% and 16.2% respectively), while these percentages are far lower in Norway (6.8% and 3.6% respectively).

Table 2 shows the degree of agreement of young people with what we call the “patriarchal culture”, measured through the survey question below. The different answers obtained for each country highlight the normative variations in regard to family attitudes and values. As can be observed, Norway is the most equitable country as it has a greater proportion of young people who disagree with the statement that women should abandon the labour market to take care of the family, followed by Spain and Germany. It is worth noting the high percentage of young people who say they agree with this statement (40% in Germany and 31% in Spain, compared to 25% in Norway).

The differences in regard to women’s role in the family not only vary between countries, but also between sexes. Table 3 shows that the largest differences -almost 7 points- between men and women, are found in Spain and Germany, whereas in Norway, where the traditional male breadwinner family is relatively uncommon, there are fewer differences between men and women in the answers to the question as to whether women should abandon the labour market to devote themselves to the family, and this is also the country in which this statement receives the least support. Spanish and German women show a greater percentage of adherence to this normative expectation (61.7% and 61.3% respectively) compared to only 34.4% of Norwegian women. Once again, these data point to the different developments of family policies in these countries and to their incidence in the perception and expectations of fathers and mothers. It is also worth noting that in all countries a higher percentage of young women than young men subscribe to the role of the woman as carer.

The answers to the other question, which we refer to as “work-related gender ideology” differ from the previous variable (see Table 4). We observe that the percentage of young people who believe that, when work is scarce, men are more entitled to jobs than women is very low in all three countries (less than 10%), and relatively lower in Norway. This may point to a conflict in normative expectations in regard to work and the family in Germany and Spain, as in work-related issues young people agree that there should be no gender inequality when accessing employment. However, when asked about the desirability of women abandoning the labour market to take care of the family, the percentage increases considerably in these two countries.

The next step was to perform a regression analysis based on the variables described in the methodological section. When the three countries considered are entered into the model, the coefficients show that only age, work-related gender ideology, and being unemployed and not seeking work are significant in predicting the likelihood of attitudes and values that are favourable to the patriarchal family culture. As can be seen in Table 5, older respondents who disagree more with the statement that men should be more entitled than women to work when jobs are scarce are less in agreement with the patriarchal family culture. Respondents in a situation of unemployment and not actively seeking work are more likely to declare themselves in favour of the patriarchal family culture. Therefore, work expectations, employment situation and age are the variables that best predict post-patriarchal values in family matters among young people.

Table 6 shows the linear regression coefficients that predict post-patriarchal values in young people in the countries that were shown to be significant in the analytical model. After stratifying by country, it should first be noted that, contrary to expectations, sex is not significant in any of the reference countries; this appears to indicate that progress in post-patriarchal family values is not a matter of sex, but of other variables that affect both sexes equally. Although the descriptive tables 1 and 3 highlight significant differences between countries in relation to gender roles in family preferences by sex, these differences fade when other variables are introduced in the analysis, suggesting that the attitudes and values are not explained solely by sex.

In general terms, the coefficients of the socio-demographic variables indicate that education and employment situations have a significant incidence on post-patriarchal values in Spain. The coefficients show that the higher the educational level the greater the likelihood of disagreeing with the statement that women should abandon the labour market to care for children. Another factor worth noting is the importance of the mother’s education. The more highly educated the respondent’s mother, the less he or she agrees with this patriarchal expression. Age is also a factor in all the countries; the older the respondents, the greater their disagreement with patriarchal family values. This result can be explained as a consequence of maturity in personal and family expectations, or it could also mean that younger people are less reflective in terms of gender equality in the family, perhaps because they still see the time when they will themselves form a family and become working mothers and fathers as being somewhat remote. In any case, this result is perplexing when analysed in relation with the results of other surveys that point to the rise of traditional patriarchal and sexist values among young people.

In the case of Germany, where family policies have historically been specifically designed to support the role of the mother as a carer for children, having children and the possibility of having children in the next three years increases the likelihood of agreeing with the statement that women should leave paid work to take care of the family. In Spain and Norway these variables are not significant. This result indirectly confirms the key role of public policies in normative expectations, including those of younger people who could initially be expected to be more in favour of post-patriarchal values in family matters.

In the case of Spain, in addition to cohabitation, other notable and significant variables include being unemployed and the number of hours dedicated to domestic chores. Young people who are unemployed and are not actively seeking employment are more likely to hold patriarchal family values towards the role of women as care providers. It is also worth noting that the more hours the respondent spends on domestic chores, the greater the probability is that they subscribe to the idea of the patriarchal family culture. Finally, the case of Norway is interesting, where -as was anticipated- only the variable for work-related gender ideology is significant.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The scientific literature has verified the thesis that the dual-earner model is starting to prevail over the male breadwinner model, although the trends of change depend on the country and the institutional development of family policies in favour of family co-responsibility and equitable integration of parents with family responsibilities in the labour market (Moreno Mínguez 2015Moreno Mínguez, A. 2015. “La ambivalencia ante la corresponsabilidad parental en España: Una cuestión de género”. Revista la Ventana, 42: 46-98.; Lewis and Daly 2000Lewis, J. and Daly 2000. “The concept of social care and the analysis of contemporary welfare states”. British Journal of Sociology, 51 (2): 281-298. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2000.00281.x ; Pfau-Effinger 2004Pfau-Effinger, B. 2004. “Socio-historical paths of the male breadwinner model - an explanation of cross-national differences”. The British Journal of Sociology 55 (3):377-399. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00025.x ; Aboim 2010Aboim, S. 2010. Labour and Love: the gender division of labour and caring in across-national perspective. Inn S. Aboim Ed. , Plural Masculinities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 83-109.).

These studies confirm that states play an important role in gender ideology through policy and attitude structuring. The reflection on family culture in comparative perspectives should begin by underlining the fact that given the institutional advances in family and gender policies, Norway is the most equitable country, when compared to Spain and Germany, as has been documented in the literature on this subject (Karu and Kasearu 2011Karu, M., and Kasearu, K. 2011. “Slow Steps Towards Dual Earner/ Dual Carer Family Model: Why Fathers do not Take Parental Leave”. Studies of Transition States and Societies, 3 (1): 24-38.; Engster and Stensöta 2011Engster. D. and Stensöta, H. O. 2011. “Do Family Policy Regimes Matter for Children’s Well-Being”. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, 18 (1): 82-124. https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxr006 ; Daly and Scheiwe 2010Daly, M. and Scheiwe, K. 2010. “Individualisation and personal obligations Social policy, family policy and law reform in Germany and the UK”. International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 24 (2): 177-197. https://doi.org/10.1093/lawfam/ebq005 ; Fagan 2002Fagan, C. 2002. “How many hours? Work-time regimes and preferences in European countries”. In G. Crow and S. Heath Eds. , Social conceptions of time: Structure and process in work and everyday life pp. 69-77 . Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.) whereas Spain and Germany represent a European policy model supporting a breadwinning/homemaker ideal with different meanings (Hagqvista et al. 2017Hagqvist, E. (2016). The juggle and struggle of everyday life Gender, division of work, work-family perceptions and well-being in different policy contexts, Doctoral tesis; Moreno Mínguez, et al. 2017Moreno Mínguez, A., Ortega Gaspar, M. and Gamero, C. 2017. “Los modelos familiares en España: reflexionando sobre la ambivalencia familiar desde una aproximación teórica”. Revista Española de Sociología, 26 (2): 149-167. http://dx.doi.org/10.22325/fes/res.2016.5 ). In Spain the studies confirm that many couples maintain a traditional family model in which women are responsible for the care of younger children, while men assume the role of the main breadwinner and women adopt complementary positions to the man’s salary (Leon and Pavolini, 2014Leon, M. and Pavolini, E. 2015. Social Investment’ or Back to ‘Familism’: The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Family and Care Policies in Italy and Spain, Volume 19 (3): https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2014.948603 ; Moreno Mínguez 2015Moreno Mínguez, A. 2015. “La ambivalencia ante la corresponsabilidad parental en España: Una cuestión de género”. Revista la Ventana, 42: 46-98.). However, there are fewer studies on whether these values operate in the same way for young people. This study reveals that there are relevant differences in the family attitudes of young people depending not only on the cultural context of each country, but also on variables such as education or gender ideology. These results do not fit neatly with STD theories.

The descriptive comparative analysis presented in this study evidences the relative acceptance of the traditional family model among young Spaniards and Germans, although this model is practically absent in the case of young Norwegians, essentially due to the fact that it is a more equitable society where family and gender policies have a long historical tradition. These results hark back to the interpretation of Pfau-Effinger (2004) Pfau-Effinger, B. 2004. “Socio-historical paths of the male breadwinner model - an explanation of cross-national differences”. The British Journal of Sociology 55 (3):377-399. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00025.x , according to which the historical evolution of family and work-related models internalised by social classes -and specifically by the middle classes- has constituted a significant input in family culture and has therefore contributed to the attitudes and values related to the male breadwinner model. It is also noteworthy that there are minimal differences between men and women in Norway in terms of their (limited) support for the patriarchal family culture, whereas these differences are greater in Germany and Spain; it is particularly worth highlighting the considerable support from women for this type of patriarchal expression, which initially appears to contradict one of the main feminist demands in Spain.

The descriptive analysis shows the incidence of the educational variable in Spain as a neutraliser of patriarchal family attitudes. The couple’s education operates in a similar way, so it can be concluded that education in Spain acts as a conduit for transmitting post-patriarchal and equitable values within the family. These variables are only significant in Spain. The explanation could be that in a country such as Norway, with a long-established tradition of gender equality policies, there are no great differences and gaps in values with the post-patriarchal family. In Spain the family policy has favoured a gender equality ideology. In Norway, a society with a long tradition of egalitarian family policy, the effect of education on attitudes is almost neutral, while in Spain the effect is significant. In Spain there is a clear trend towards egalitarian attitudes in those who are more educated, with a notable effect among young people.

It is precisely in countries with a familist tradition where post-patriarchal values are progressively taking root and where education and the employment situation differentiate the normative positions of young people towards gender equality and the family. The results also reveal that post-patriarchal values in young people are associated with cohabitation. When young people cohabit instead of marrying, they are more likely to disagree with traditional family gender ideology. This finding is of significant interest, as prior studies have evidenced the innovative behaviours of cohabiting couples, particularly in countries such as Spain, where cohabitation as a practice is on the rise but is still relatively uncommon in comparison with Norway, where this is the most common situation for couples (Domínguez and Castro Martín 2013). These results are consistent with findings of previous research (Crompton and Lyonette 2005; De Backer et al. 2008DeBacker, T. K., Crowson, H. M., Beesley, A. D., Thoma, S. J., and Hestevold, N. L. 2008. 2The challenge of measuring epistemic beliefs: An analysis of three self-report instruments”. The Journal of Experimental Education, 76 (3): 281-312. https://doi.org/10.3200/JEXE.76.3.281-314 ; Van Wel and Knijn 2007Van Wel, F. and Knijn, T. 2007. “Single mothers’ motivation to work and their participation in the labour market in the Netherlands”. International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 33 (1): 183-196.; Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz 2011Bryan, M. L., and Sevilla-Sanz, A. 2011. “Does housework lower wages? Evidence for Britain”. Oxford Economic Papers, 63 (1): 187-210. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpq011 ). On the other hand, these analyses reinforce the idea that gender differences cannot be explained simply from an economic perspective (Álvarez and Miles 2003Alvarez, B. and Miles, D. 2003. “Gender effect of housework allocation: Evidence from Spanish two-earner couples”. Journal of Population Economics 16 (3): 227-242. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480200126 ; Bittman et al. 2003; Washbrook 2007Washbrook, E. 2007. Explaining the Gender Division of Labour: the role of the gender wage gap. University of Bristol, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Working paper, N0. 07/174.).

The differences between Spain and Germany are partly explained by the expectations created by family policy. While conservative-corporatist welfare states such as Germany and Austria also merit the familistic label, the key difference between the countries of Central and Southern Europe is that in the former the male-breadwinner model has been maintained through family and fiscal policies that facilitated, if not encouraged, the role of women as careers in the private domain, whereas in the southern countries familism has largely been ‘unsupported’ (Keck & Saraceno 2010: MeilSaraceno, Ch. And Keck, W. 2010. Can we identify intergenerational policy regimes in Europe?. European Societies 12(5):675-696, DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2010.483006 , Moreno and Crespi, 2016Moreno Mínguez, A. and Crespi I. 2016. “Gender equality and family changes in the work-family culture in Southern Europe”. International Review of Sociology, 27 (3): 394-420. DOI: 10.1080/03906701.2017.1377406 ), resulting in a strange kind of subsidiarity principle whereby such familistic culture is in fact the justification for the residual character of this policy domain (León 2002; Flaquer 2000Flaquer, L. 2000. La articulación entre familia y Estado de bienestar en los países de la Europa del sur, Paper. 73: 27-58; Leon and Pavolini, 2014Leon, M. and Pavolini, E. 2015. Social Investment’ or Back to ‘Familism’: The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Family and Care Policies in Italy and Spain, Volume 19 (3): https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2014.948603 ). This would explain the fact that in Germany the expectation of having a child is a decisive factor in family values. Historically this has been the standardised behaviour pattern fostered by family policy in Germany. These results corroborate the theory of socialisation in gender values at the micro and macro level through the action or inaction of family policies (Sullivan et al. 2018Sullivan, O. Gershuny, J. and Robinson, P. 2018. “Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution? A Long-Term Processual Framework for Understanding Why Change Is Slow: Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution?”. Journal of Family Theory and Review 10 2: 263-279. https://doi.org/10.1111/jftr.12248 ).

The findings evidence that unemployment is associated with more traditional values towards the male breadwinner model (Bittman et al. 2003, Brines 1994Brines J. 1994. “Economic dependency, gender, and the division of labor at home”. American Journal of Sociology, 100, 652-688. https://doi.org/10.1086/230577 ; Greenstein 2000Greenstein T. 2000. “Economic dependence, gender, and the division of labor in the home: A replication and extension2. Journal of Marriage and the Family: 62,322-335. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2000.00322.x ; Killewald and Gough 2010Killewald A, Gough M. 2010. “Money isn’t everything: Wives’ earnings and housework time”. Social Science Research, 39:987-1003. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.08.005 ). Being unemployed in Spain and dedicating more time to domestic tasks increases the probability of subscribing to favourable attitudes to the patriarchal family. These results are interesting, as in a country like Spain with high youth unemployment, in addition to the social and personal fracture this represents, there may also be other possible consequences for gender inequality in matters relating to childcare, the division of family work, and family co-responsibility as drivers of gender equality. It is worth noting that in Norway only the variable “work gender ideology” is significant. This can be explained by the advances in family and gender policies in Norwegian society compared to Germany and Spain. The post-patriarchal family, gender equality and co-responsibility for childcare have been recognised and experienced by Norwegian citizens for decades, which would explain why factors such as education, presence of children or the employment situation of young people have no explanatory relevance in their normative expectations and values towards the post-patriarchal family.

This suggests that we are still in the midst of an ambivalent transnational historical process of social change in the direction of greater gender equality in values ​​and attitudes (Andersen and Billari 2005Esping-Andersen, G. and Billari, C. 2015. “Re-theorizing Family Demographics”, Population and Development Review 41 (1):, 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00024.x ; Moreno et al. 2017Moreno Mínguez, A., Ortega Gaspar, M. and Gamero, C. 2017. “Los modelos familiares en España: reflexionando sobre la ambivalencia familiar desde una aproximación teórica”. Revista Española de Sociología, 26 (2): 149-167. http://dx.doi.org/10.22325/fes/res.2016.5 ). The unhurried rhythm of these changes is best appreciated amongst young people. According to Sullivan (2006)Sullivan, O. 2006 . Changing gender relations, changing families: Tracing the pace of change. New York: Roman and Littlefiled. and Sullivan et al. (2018)Sullivan, O. Gershuny, J. and Robinson, P. 2018. “Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution? A Long-Term Processual Framework for Understanding Why Change Is Slow: Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution?”. Journal of Family Theory and Review 10 2: 263-279. https://doi.org/10.1111/jftr.12248 it is a slow, contradictory process with different results depending on the institutional and generational context. In the case of Southern European countries, the institutional delay in the development of gender policies has meant a slower change rather than a revolutionary shift in gender equality, which is subsequently reflected in the attitudes and values ​​of young people facing the practices, attitudes and interactions provoked by the patriarchal model of family relationships, when compared to those of young people of northern Europe. Young people from Northern Europe have more socialising experience within the parameters of equality, among other reasons due to the longer historical trajectory they have in gender equality policies in terms of work and family compatibility.

These findings confirm the thesis of Fuwa (2004)Fuwa, M. 2004. “Macro-level gender inequality and the division of household labor in 22 countries”. American Sociological Review, 69: 751-767. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240406900601 and Kasearu (2009)Kasearu, K. 2009. “The Effect of Union Type on Work-Life Conflict in Five European Countries”, Soc Indic Res 93:549-567. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-008-9432-3 for the countries in this study. In fact, the respondent’s education, and that of their partner and mother, are key factors in the likelihood of young Spaniards’ assuming the post-patriarchal family model. In contrast, in Germany -where family policies have encouraged a family model based on the role of the mother as care provider- and in Norway -where family policy has favoured greater equality in family gender roles- this is not a determining factor. The same can be observed of the marital status and employment situation. In Spain, family policies supporting family co-responsibility between sexes were launched barely a decade ago, and structural and cultural factors still have considerable importance, so cohabiting and having a job are life circumstances that act as transmitters of post-patriarchal values. To a certain extent these results agree with the theories of Crompton and Lyonette (2005)Crompton, R. and Lyonette, C. 2000. “The new Gender essentialism - domestic and family ‘choices’ and their relation to attitudes”. British Journal of Sociology, 56 (4): 601-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2005.00085.x and Crompton et al. (2007)Crompton R., Lewis S. and Lyonette C. 2007. “Introduction: The Unravelling of the ‘Male breadwinner’ Model - and Some of its Consequences”. In: Crompton R., Lewis S., Lyonette C. eds Women, Men, Work and Family in Europe.London: Palgrave Macmillan. on the incidence of the variables for social class and the context in which young people live as factors explaining the persistence of certain patriarchal values in societies such as Spain, which are founded on the contradictory input of traditional family values. However, in Norway, only gender ideology is a significant variable, as this is a more advanced society in terms of gender policies and equitable family models, and hence in family co-responsibility. In agreement with the literature mentioned here, the results confirm that the incidence of gender identity on individual behaviour partly explains why spending more hours on household chores contributes to reproducing the patriarchal family model, and also why a considerable percentage of young people in Spain and Germany continue to prefer a traditional family model in spite of rising education levels (Akerlof and Kranton 2000Akerlof, G. and Kranton R. 2000. “Economics and Identity”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (3): 715-753. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554881 ; Gundert 2015Auspurg, K., and Gundert, S. 2015. “Precarious employment and bargaining power: Results of a factorial survey analysis”. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 44 (2): 99-117. https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-2015-0204 ). According to this idea, the familist orientation of family policies in Germany and the limited development of these policies in Spain may have contributed to creating a model with a mixed and contradictory balance of family values and preferences (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015Esping-Andersen, G. and Billari, C. 2015. “Re-theorizing Family Demographics”, Population and Development Review 41 (1):, 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00024.x ; Sullivan 2006Sullivan, O. 2006 . Changing gender relations, changing families: Tracing the pace of change. New York: Roman and Littlefiled. ), in which the gender identity associated to the patriarchal family, and internalised in the form of gender norms, plays a role in the ambivalence of young people’s attitudes, which in turn translates to behaviours that are similarly ambivalent.

In short, these results point to the need for greater awareness of young people’s work and family trajectories, and the development of family, economic and employment policies that allow young people to satisfactorily resolve their dilemmas and thus contribute to encouraging equitable values beyond the patriarchal family. Youth transitions are a key moment for defining these post-patriarchal values in their personality, their social relations and their relationships with their partners and families, so the audacity and capacity of all those concerned will be required to construct a normative, institutional and family environment based on the equitable values of a post-patriarchal family that shares responsibility for child-rearing, caring and family and partner relationships. The combination of normative ideologies regarding work and family balance, family policies measures, generational change and individual factors explain the differences between countries for young people in the values related to a post-patriarchal family. Future research should focus on the ways meso-level theories relate to the generational change of family values and aim to go beyond dualistic interpretations of family change. This could help us to understand whether changes and trends associated with the gender revolution are affecting generations, groups and countries differently.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

In methodological terms, the findings presented underline that the heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation are factors to consider for future theorising and applications in the comparative study of attitudes on family models. The research indicates that gender and family attitudes are linked to macro-level institutional context. Unfortunately, it is impossible from the data of this survey to establish a causal relationship between structural characteristics and individual attitudinal ones. Additional longitudinal and/or cross-national data are necessary to determine the precise relationship between these macro- and micro-level processes.