Coordinación y acción colectiva

Luis Miguel Miller Moya

doi:10.3989/ris.2007.i46.8

Autores/as

Luis Miguel Miller Moya Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados (IESA / CSIC). Córdoba.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2007.i46.8

Palabras clave:

Conocimiento común, Cooperación, Teoría de juegos, Convenciones, Principios Normativos

Resumen

El presente trabajo destaca la importancia de comprender los problemas de coordinación para el estudio de la acción colectiva. Para ello, el artículo se compone de tres partes. En primer lugar, se presentan las principales diferencias entre problemas de cooperación y problemas de coordinación. En segundo lugar, se analiza la estructura de un problema de coordinación, con especial atención a la relación entre las situaciones de coordinación y la generación de conocimiento común. En tercer lugar, se describen las soluciones más recurrentes a los problemas de coordinación, a saber, acuerdos, prominencia y aprendizaje. Tras considerar este conjunto de soluciones, el artículo especula sobre otros modos de interpretar cómo se resuelven los problemas de coordinación.

Descargas

Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.

Citas

Alvard, M. y D. Nolin (2002), “Rousseau’s Whale Hunt? Coordination among Big Game Hunters”, Current Anthropology, vol. 43 (4), pp. 533-559. doi:10.1086/341653

Aumann, R. J. (1976), “Agreeing to Disagree”, Annals of Statistics, vol. 4, pp. 1236-1239. doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654

Büchner, S., W. Güth y L. M. Miller (2005), “Conventions for Implementing Conventions. An Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis”, Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany.

Calvert, R. L. (1992), “Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination”, International Political Science Review, vol. 13(4), pp. 7-24. doi:10.1177/019251219201300102

Camerer, C. F. (2003), “Coordination”, en C. F. Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 337-407.

Chong, D. (1991), Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

Chwe, M. (1998a), “Believe the Hype: Solving Coordination Problems with Television Advertising”, artículo sin publicar, vol. 10 (1), pp.47-75.

Chwe, M. (1998b), “Culture, Circles and Commercials: Publicity, Common Knowledge, and Social Coordination”, Rationality and Society

Chwe, M. (2001), Rational Rituals: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Cortázar, R. (1997), “Non-Redundant Groups, the Assurance Game and the Origins of Collective Action”, Public Choice, vol. 92, pp. 41-53. doi:10.1023/A:1017918201106

Cubitt, R. P. y R. Sugden (2003), “Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis’ Game Theory”, Economics and Philosophy, vol. 19, pp. 175-210. doi:10.1017/S0266267103001123

De Jonge, J. P. R. (1998), “Coordination and Cooperation in Game Theory”, De Economist, vol. 146(1), pp. 159-167. doi:10.1023/A:1003262227223

Frohlich, N. et al. (1971), Political Leadership and Collective Goods, Nueva York, Princeton University Press.

Gauthier, D. (1975), “Coordination”, Dialogue, vol. 14, pp. 195-221.

Gilbert, M. (1989), On Social Facts, Londres, Routledge.

Gilbert, M. (2001), “Collective Preferences, Obligations, and Rational Choice”, Economics and Philosophy, vol. 17, pp. 109-119. doi:10.1017/S0266267101000177

Hardin, G. (1968), “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, vol. 162: pp. 1243-48. doi:10.1126/science.162.3859.1243 PMid:AMBIGUOUS 17756331,9563937,5699198

Hardin, R. (1971), “Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners’ Dilemma”, Behavioral Science, vol. 16 (5), pp. 472-481. doi:10.1002/bs.3830160507

Hardin, R. (1982), Collective Action, Londres, John Hopkins University Press.

Hardin, R. (1990), “The Social Evolution of Cooperation”, en K. S. Cook y M. Levi, The Limits of Rationality, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 358-372.

Hardin, R. (1991), “Acting Together, Contributing Together”, Rationality and Society, vol. 3(3), pp. 365-380. doi:10.1177/1043463191003003007

Hardin, R. (1995), One for All: the logic of group conflict, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Janssen, M. (2001), “On the Principle of Coordination”, Economics and Philosophy vol. 17 (2), pp. 221-234. doi:10.1017/S0266267101000244

Kollock, P. (1998), “Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation”, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 24, pp. 183-214. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183

Komorita, S. S. (1994), “Introduction”, en S. S. Komorita, Social Dilemmas, Madison, Brown and Benchmark.

Kristof, N. D. y. S. W. (1994), China Wakes. The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power, Nueva York, Times Books.

Lewis, D. (1969), Conventions. A Philosophical Study, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Marx, K. (2003 [1851]), El dieciocho de Brumario de Luis Bonaparte, Madrid, Alianza.

Miller, L. M. (2004), “Escenarios para la acción colectiva”, Revista Internacional de Sociología, nº 39, pp. 167-197.

Miller, L. M. (2006a), “The Double Nature of Conventions: An Experimental Analysis”, Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany.

Miller, L. M. (2006b), Coordinación y convención: Un estudio teórico y experimental de la noción de convención social, Tesis inédita, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Moore, W. H. (1995), “Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem”, Political Research Quarterly, vol. 48, pp. 417-454.

Oberschall, A. R. (1994), “Rational Choice in Collective Protest”, Rationality and Society, vol. 6 (1), pp. 79-100. doi:10.1177/1043463194006001006

Opp, K. D. (1994), “Repression and Revolutionary Action: East Germany in 1989”, Rationality and Society, vol. 6 (1), pp. 101-138. doi:10.1177/1043463194006001007

O’neill, B. (2000), Honor, Symbols and War, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.

Olson, M. (1971), The Logic of Collective Action. Publics Goods and the Theory of the Groups, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.

Oliver, P. (1993), “Formal Models of Collective Action”, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 19, pp. 271-300. doi:10.1146/annurev.so.19.080193.001415

Orbell, J. y. R. Dawes (1981), “Social Dilemmas”, en G. M. S. y. J. M. Davis (eds.), Progress in Applied Social Psychology, Nueva York, Wiley, pp. 37-65.

Ostrom, E. (1998), “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997”, American Political Science Review, vol. 92 (1), pp. 1-22. doi:10.2307/2585925

Reuben, E. (2003), The Evolution of Theories of Collective Action, Amsterdan, Universidad de Amsterdam.

Rousseau, J. J. (1982 [1775]), Discurso sobre el origen y los fundamentos de la desigualdad entre los hombres, Madrid, Alianza.

Sacconi, L. y S. Moretti (2002), “Fuzzy Norms, Default Reasoning and Equilibrium Selection in Games under Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Knowledge”, Liuc Papers in Ethics, Law and Economics, nº 104, Universidad Catteneo.

Sally, D. (2002), “‘What An Ugly Baby!’ Risk Dominance, Sympathy, and the Coordination of Meaning”, Rationality and Society, vol. 14 (1), pp. 78-108. doi:10.1177/1043463102014001004

Schelling, T. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.

Schotter, A. y B. Sopher (2003), “Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental study”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 111 (3), pp. 498-429. doi:10.1086/374187

Sugden, R. (2000), “Team Preferences”, Economics and Philosophy, vol. 16, pp. 175-204. doi:10.1017/S0266267100000213

Taylor, M. (1987), The Possibility of Cooperation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Udéhn, L. (1993), “Twenty-five Years with The Logic of Collective Action”, Acta Sociologica, vol. 36, pp. 239-261. doi:10.1177/000169939303600307

Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1977), The Emergence of Norms, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Van Lange, P., W. Liebrand, D. Messick y H. Wilke (1992), “Introduction and Literature Review”, en W. Liebrand, D. Messick y H. Wilke, Social Dilemmas. Theoretical Issues and Research Findings, Oxford, Pergamon Press.

Wilson, R. K. y. C. M Rhodes (1997), “Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination Games”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41 (6), pp. 767-791. doi:10.1177/0022002797041006003

Young, H. P. (1996), “The Economics of Convention”, Journal of Economics Perspectives, vol. 10, pp. 105- 122.