Revista Internacional de Sociología, Vol 65, No 46 (2007)

Cooperar por principio


https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2007.i46.2

Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
Instituto Juan March y Universidad Complutense. Madrid, España

Resumen


En este trabajo se analiza el papel potencial de las motivaciones morales en la acción colectiva. En concreto, se sugiere que la motivación moral puede funcionar de manera distinta a las normas sociales de reciprocidad que se han estudiado en la economía del comportamiento. Se presenta una nueva función de utilidad que integra los componentes clásicos de la literatura de acción colectiva y en la que se añade un componente moral. Según este componente moral, el agente aumenta o disminuye su utilidad en función de cuánto se desvíe con respecto a la media social de cooperación. Se muestra cómo la utilidad moral puede modificar un Dilema del Prisionero en otros juegos más favorables para la cooperación. Finalmente, se presentan algunas implicaciones del modelo con respecto al efecto crowding out y al concepto de sacrificio personal.

Palabras clave


Acción colectiva; Utilidad moral; Efecto crowding out; Sacrificio

Texto completo:


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